The root problem with strategy in Iraq is that Bush administration has been behind the reality on the ground from the moment looting broke out in the days after the fall of Baghdad. Their conception of the dynamics of the conflict have consistently produced tactics and strategies which have been months late.
The Early Sunni InsurgencyWithin months after the fall of Baghdad, the first stirrings of a Sunni insurgency were evident. The US leadership largely viewed this nascent insurgency as "former Baathists and deadenders," with the conception that those Sunnis fighting the US were doing so because they wanted Saddam to return to power.
Within this understanding, the Sunnis were a fixed number force. If you could kill enough former Baathist leaders, there would be no more insecurity in Iraq.
But that understanding was flawed. Even in the early days of Iraq, the Sunnis were fighting for political reasons. Their goal was not to return Saddam to power, but to influence the future politics in Iraq. It was not a small, discreet group of Baathists and army officers fighting for a fixed goal, but a reflection of a broader political movement with deep support for their political goals. (if not their violent means.)
In the midst of this misconception of the nature of the Sunni insurgency, the US treated undertook a strategy to "crush the insurgency" culminating, most notably in the destruction of Fallujah.
In the "Baathists and deadenders" understanding, the Fallujah tactics made sense, but in the reality of an insurgency, it was completely the wrong thing to do, creating more resistance.
The Askariyah Mosque Bombing
In the time leading up to the bombing of the Askariyah Mosque in February, the US had begun to abandon its "Baathists and deadenders" presentation of the Sunni violence.
But the top level understanding was still limited, From mid 2005 through mid 2006, the administration perceived the problem to be Al Qaeda as the primary fomenter of the growing sectarian hatred.
In this understanding, a strategy was crafted to use special forces and strike raids to seek out and destroy the terrorists.
Yes, there were Al Qaeda. Yes, they were acting to foment the violence. But while the US was engaging in tactics to stop Zarqawi and his men, their strategy missed the larger and far more significant development.
The Shia MilitiasThe Shia militias had been present in some form since before the US invaded. They had been organized groups against Saddam, but because of his brutality, they had been kept small, disorganized, and limited. Even in early post invasion Iraq, the Shia militias were largely local, loosely affiliated, neighborhood affairs.
But, with the increasing attacks by Zarqawi and other Sunni groups, the Shia militias rapidly grew in numbers and prominence as a necessary Shia defense force. While the US was chasing Zarqawi, the Shia militias were developing and extending their infiltration into the government and security forces, giving them a potent weapon in quickly developing civil war.
"Sectarian Violence" and Operation Forward TogetherBy mid 2006, the US had recognized that the sectarian violence had become a major destabilizing influence. The solution to this problem was deemed to be Operation Forward Together, a significant influx of troops into Baghdad with the intention of enacting a large scale "clear, hold, build" counterinsurgency strategy. US troops were to "clear," then hand over control to the Iraq security forces for the "hold, build."
But Iraq wasn't in the grips of limited "sectarian violence" where discreet elements and flashpoints could be put down. Iraq was in the beginnings of a broadbased civil war.
The whole precept of "clear, hold, build" is that it's a counterinsurgency strategy primarily designed to be enacted in a binary occupier/occupied relationship. The concept is to remove the violent elements and then convince the remaining locals that their lives will be better if they abandon their resistance to the current power structure.
But, Forward Together was not conducted against that simple binary relationship. The US was attempting to pass that establishment of control over to the Shia led government.
The flaw in this was that the Iraqi security forces, infiltrated by the Shia militias, and the Iraqi government, mostly influenced by the Shia militias, didn't really want this stability to take place. So, as the US "cleared" neighborhoods, the Shia used the opportunity to advantage their side in that civil war.
So, even at this late date, the US's strategy was based on the misbelief that the Shia government wanted peace and stability.
The Basic Flaw and the "Way Forward"I don't normally write long form like this, but I think this is a very important point. Time and again, US Iraq policy has foundered because the tactics and strategy were based on a previous understanding, or misunderstanding, of the current conditions on the ground in Iraq. The US has repeatedly gone in with the wrong tool.
So, as we look forward to Bush's next strategy for Iraq, due to be announced next week, keep this in mind. The plan is likely to involve US forces taking on the Shia militias. The understanding seems to be that "extreme" elements on the Shia side are derailing the good intentions of the centrists and the Maliki government.
The two basic flaws in that thinking are:
1) That the Shia leadership in power (even the "moderates") benefit from a cessation of the current situation.
2) That the "extremist" Shia militias (Sadr) don't enjoy broad support for their goals and aims against the Sunni.
The Shia are winning this civil war. The Shia powers are served by the current situation. They are gaining territory, both real and political, and even the civilian deaths serve to fuel their power.
Initially, Sadr's factional rivals may allow this attack against the Mahdi to knock him back a bit, but in the longer term, this will only serve to fuel the Shia cause. It's almost Fallujah all over again.
Once again, the US is looking to undertake a strategy without an understanding of the politics on the ground. Maybe it will work out this time.......
(And, I recognize this is a massive oversimplification, but I didn't want to write a book.)
Later: I left out one more thing. The current conception seems to be ignoring the current reality that Iraq has already become a regionally supported civil war with the Saudis, Syrians, Iranians, Egyptians, and others already supplying support to the various sides.
Any plan that does not involve a regional settlement with all of these players will be nearly impossible, because if one outside party fuels the conflict, there will be continuing pressures for the others to do the same.
